Over the past decade or so, the electricity industry of the Republic of Turkey (and indeed the world) has undergone profound reform in its structure, ownership and mindset. Increasing public concern about efficiency in the sector has led Turkey to discard the traditional model of a vertically integrated industry subject to cost-based regulation in favor of the unbundling of activities and the introduction of competition where it is possible. The industry has been structurally separated into generation, transmission, distribution and retail segments. The competitive segments of the industry (generation and retail) are planed to progressively expose to competition; the monopoly segments (especially, distribution) are to be reoriented to foster competition. Further, the ownership of the industry is under increasing pressure to move away from the public domain into the private one. The present article not only presents an analysis of the Turkish distribution sector and proposed privatization process but also provides some guidelines for policy makers.
Introduction
Turkey's electricity distribution utility, TEDAS, and its distribution companies are Turkish state-owned joint-stock companies engaged in the distribution and retail sale of electricity and provision of retail services to final customers.
With approximately 28 million customers, 93 billion kWh of electricity sales and 98% market share in electricity distribution across Turkey in 2005, TEDAS and its distribution companies together form one of the largest organizations in the country (Lazard, 2007) .
In the article, the evolution of Turkish electricity distribution industry is analyzed and then the decision about the privatization of Turkish electricity distribution regions is considered. The article is divided into four main sections. In Section 2 the reader is briefly familiarized with the Turkish economy and energy situation. Section 3 provides an impression of the Turkish electricity distribution business; including its evolution, recent market reforms, legal environment and ongoing privatization process. Section 4 elaborates on the question of "why should the distribution be privatized?". In Section 5, current policies are evaluated and some guidelines are introduced for policy makers to prevent some irreversible mistakes in market structure policy. Finally, a summary and some concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
A summary of Turkish economy and energy situation
The Republic of Turkey, located in Southeastern Europe and Southwestern Asia (that portion of Turkey west of the Bosporus is geographically part of Europe), has an area of about 780,580 sq km and a population of over 70 million (CIA, 2007) . With its young population, growing energy demand per person, fast growing urbanization and economic development, Turkey has been one of the fast growing power markets of the world for the last two decades. Turkey is an energy importing country; more than half of the energy requirement has been supplied by imports.
Turkey's dynamic economy is a complex mix of modern industry and commerce along with a traditional agriculture sector that still accounts for more than 35% of employment. It has a strong and rapidly growing private sector, yet the state still plays a major role in basic industry, banking, transport, and communication. Real GNP growth has exceeded 6% in many years, but this strong expansion has been interrupted by sharp declines in output in 1994, 1999 and 2001 Turkey's population of more than 70 million is growing at an annual rate of 1.04% and expected to grow to 83.4 million in 2022. In response to the growth rates of population and consumption, Turkey's total final energy consumption (TFC) grew at an average annual rate of 9.6% over the last three decades. This average annual growth rate of TFC is projected to decrease to 5. 4% between 2005 4% between and 2010 4% between and 7% between 2010 4% between and 2020 4% between (Evrendilek et al., 2003 . Table 1 presents some important selected
Indicators for Turkey as of 2004 (CIA, 2007 .
[ Table 1 goes here ]
Turkey's primary energy sources include hydropower, geothermal, lignite, hard coal, oil, natural gas, wood, animal and plant wastes, solar and wind energy. In 2004, primary energy production and consumption has reached 24.1 million tonnes (Mt) of oil equivalent (Mtoe) and 81.9 Mtoe, respectively. oil (31.5%) in first place, followed by coal (27.3%) and natural gas (22.8%).
Turkey has not utilized nuclear energy yet 2 . The Turkish coal sector, which includes hard coal as well as lignite, accounts for nearly one half of the country's total primary energy production (%43.7). The renewables collectively provided 13.2% of the primary energy, mostly in the form of combustible renewables and wastes (6.8%), hydropower (about 4.8%) and other renewable energy resources (approximately 1.6%) (IEA, 2007) [ Table 2 goes here ]
As can be seen in Table 2 , the general equilibrium of energy use and supply indicators show that Turkey is dependent on import resources very heavily. In 2004, 77.6% of the total energy supply was met by imports, and the rest was domestically produced.
Turkey's total electricity production and installed capacity were 162.5 GWh 3 and 38. 8 MW, respectively, in 2005 (Erdogdu, 2007a . The distribution of the produced electricity energy according to primary energy sources was as follows: natural gas 44.74%, hydropower 25.11%, coal 25.05%, oil 4.92%, biomass 0.09%, geothermal 0.06% and wind 0.04% (Kone et al., 2007) . Table 3 reflects the increasing reliance on natural gas 4 in the power sector.
The share of natural gas power plants in installed capacity was about 37% in 2005. Likewise, natural gas had the largest share in gross electricity output in 2005.
[ Table 3 goes here ] 7
The forces that fuel growth in the sector are continued economic and industrial development, population growth and improving income levels.
According to projections prepared by the national transmission company TEIAS on the growth of supply, there is sufficient generation capacity at least until year 2009. Required investments for more capacity are expected to be covered primarily by private sector investments (Lazard, 2007) .
3. An Outline of Turkish Electricity Distribution Industry
Evolution of the Turkish electricity industry 6
This section of the paper provides a brief overview of the evolution of electricity industry in Turkey with a view to reveal the dynamics that have shaped current reform process in electricity distribution sector.
The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, and until the 1930s the electricity industry was heavily dependent on foreign investment as the country was trying a liberal economy. In the 1930s, there was a widespread belief all over the world in the benefits of public ownership of the electricity industry. Following this trend, nationalization of Turkish electricity industry started in 1938 and, by 1944, almost all electricity industry had been placed within the public domain.
In the 1960s, the government started the "development plans era". 
Recent electricity market reforms
By the end of the 1990s, it became clear that quasi-privatization with Treasury guarantees was not going to be feasible given the rapidly deteriorating fiscal situation. Therefore, Turkey turned to a radically different framework for the design of her energy market. 
Market Opening and Market Design
As of January 2008, on the demand side, consumers that consume more than 1.2 GWh per annum are designated as "eligible consumers" that are free to choose their suppliers. The ultimate aim is stated as 100% market opening. On the supply side, the authorization-type licensing framework was established in the new regime, which provides entry opportunities into generation, wholesale supply, distribution, retail supply, import and export of electricity. Transmission remains as a state monopoly.
At the heart of the new regime is a bilateral contracts market where generation companies contract with wholesale trade companies (TETAS and any eventual new entrants), distribution companies, any new independent retail supply companies, and eligible consumers. As for end-users, eligible consumers may not only buy electricity from their regional distribution/retail supply company, but also may buy directly from a wholesale company, a new independent retail supply company or an independent generator. Captive (or non-eligible) consumers, on the other hand, must buy their electricity from the distribution/retail supply company in their region, but they also have the right to buy from any retail supply company operating in the region.
The EML requires the regulated third party access (rTPA) regime for access to the transmission and distribution system. The regulatory body (the EMRA)
will carry out the function of dispute settlement between parties.
As for public service obligations, the EML only allows for an explicit cash subsidy in the form of direct cash refunds to consumers without affecting the price structure in cases where some consumers need to be supported based on non-economic objectives.
The current market design does not envisage a centralized pool or power exchange. The actual real-time equality of demand and supply, given the bilateral contracts, will be carried out by the system operator (that is, TEIAS) through purchases and sales in a balancing market. For this purpose, a "System Balancing and Settlement Center" was established within TEIAS. In short, it is expected that the market would be mostly by bilateral contracts and pool would be limited to balancing transactions only.
Restructuring (or Unbundling)
As discussed above, TEAS has been further unbundled into EUAS (generation), TETAS (wholesale trading and contracting) and TEIAS (transmission), each organized as a separate legal entity.
Under the new structure, EUAS will take over existing public power plants that are not transferred to the private sector. TETAS is created to carry out wholesale operations and it seems that it will dominate wholesale market in the near future. TETAS is also the holder of all previous BOO, BOT and TOOR contracts, including long-term power purchase agreements with Treasury guaranties; and will assume other stranded costs. TEIAS is responsible for transmission and, critically, for the balancing and settlement procedure that will balance the power transactions among parties, both physically and financially, in the new framework. That is, TEIAS is the transmission system operator (TSO) in Turkey.
Turkey's electricity distribution network was divided into 21 distribution regions. TEDAS, which owns 20 of the 21 regions, have been included in the privatization programme, and a separate distribution company has been established in each of these 20 regions. These distribution companies are currently owned by TEDAS.
Privatization
The principal aims of EML have been to open the Turkish electricity market to competition and found an independent regulatory agency to regulate the industry. The law does not particularly stress privatization, even though it outlines general principles of privatizations (Article 14   11 ). EML's aim was to provide a way to a sustainable privatization by establishing a competitive environment.
In March 
Legal environment regarding privatization of distribution regions 13
In Turkish administrative law, the Constitutional Court and the Danistay (Council of State) recognize all segments of the electricity industry as public services, requiring close supervision by public authorities. Turkish public law deems contracts for the provision of public services by private parties to be administrative contracts. Accordingly, such contracts are subject to public Law 4046 provides the rules and regulations for any privatization in Turkey.
The Privatization Administration (PA), established under this law as an administrative agency, implements and regulates privatizations. It undertakes the management of companies in the process of privatization. The law also describes methods of privatization, gives authority to the PA to determine the value of the company, and the authority to oversee the process of privatization.
TEDAS privatization overview 15
Turkish Privatization Administration (PA) has started the privatization of Turkey's electricity distribution utility, TEDAS. PA has decided to start the privatization process with the simultaneous tender of three companies, each operating in respective regions, namely Ankara (BEDAS), Anatolian part of Istanbul (AYEDAS) and Sakarya (SEDAS).
The model
Privatization of distribution companies will be executed using a Transfer of Operating Rights (TOR) backed Share Sale model (TSS model). According to this model, the investor will be the sole owner of the shares of the distribution company which will be the unique licensee for the distribution of electricity in the designated region but which will not have the ownership of distribution network assets and other items that are essential for the operation of distribution assets. The ownership of these distribution assets will remain with TEDAS. The investor, through its shares in the distribution company, however, will be granted the right to operate the distribution assets pursuant to a Transfer of Operating Rights Agreement (TOR Agreement) with TEDAS.
Under the envisaged market structure, privatized electricity distribution companies will operate as regional monopolies with distribution licenses granted by EMRA. As part of ongoing liberalization efforts in the energy sector, Turkey's distribution network was divided into 21 distribution regions based on geographical proximity, managerial structure, energy demand and other technical/financial factors. After the inclusion of TEDAS in the privatization programme, a separate distribution company was established by the PA in each one of the 20 distribution regions owned by TEDAS. The only distribution region operated by a partially private company is Kayseri.
The aim of the TSS model is to handover a fully operating distribution company to the investor. Establishment of the distribution company as a separate legal entity, signing of the TOR Agreement, provision of distribution and retail sales licenses and signing of the Energy Sales Agreements have been defined as the necessary pre-requisites for the TSS model implementation. All of these steps have already been completed prior to the privatization tender announcement.
In the TSS model, the ownership of the existing assets and the new assets arising from investments to be carried out by the investor rests with TEDAS.
The investor shall purchase the shares of a company which holds the operating rights of distribution assets and all related assets (e.g., buildings, vehicles, machine park), and the electricity distribution and retail licenses in a given region. All investments shall be realized by the investor and will be recovered through the tariffs. Except for cases of investor misconduct, the part of investments not yet recovered via the tariffs shall be paid by TEDAS to the investor upon the expiry or termination of the contract.
Tariffs
The main purpose of the market liberalization is to achieve lower tariffs by increasing overall system efficiency. Accordingly, the tariffs are calculated as "cost-reflective" based on predetermined operating and loss/theft improvement targets.
The first tariff implementation period (or transition period), set as five years from 2006 to 2010, will serve as the transitory period to a fully cost based tariff structure after 2010. EMRA has already approved the end user tariffs and revenue requirements of each distribution company for the transition period. Revenue requirements cover the projected expenses for providing distribution and retail services and provide an allowance for the target level of technical and non-technical losses. The end-user tariffs for the period after 2010 will be determined by the distribution companies in accordance with the Electricity Market Tariffs Communiqué and the related regulations and will be subject to EMRA's approval.
The first implementation period is designed to have a smooth and gradual transition from existing tariff structure to a lean and simple tariff structure. As of 2010, most customer groups will have cost based tariffs in place and the tariff groups will be simplified to five only, namely residential, industrial, commercial, agricultural irrigation and lightening.
According to the Electricity Market Law, the Electricity Market Tariffs
Communiqué and other related regulation, the four tariff components; (a) retail sales, (b) distribution, (c) retail services and (d) transmission; are governed in an unbundled fashion. Retail sales tariff has a "price cap" which is set as the basket price of the energy purchased by the distribution company. Distribution and retail services have "revenue caps" which cover operating expenses and investment requirements related to distribution and retail services. Transmission tariff is a complete pass-through of transmission costs as charged by the national transmission company.
The existing "national tariff" scheme will be maintained for the first tariff implementation period, rather than implementing "regional tariffs" so that sudden price fluctuations could be avoided (currently, regional cost based tariffs vary significantly due to wide variation of loss/theft levels and other parameters across the regions). Implementation of national tariffs, however, will result in revenue imbalances since the distribution company revenues will differ from their envisaged revenue caps. In order to remove such imbalances, EMRA will put in place a tariff equalization scheme to transfer revenues across the regions.
While the overall tariffs are pre-determined and approved for 2006-2010, the tariff revision process has still not been finalized. The exact nature and details of the process are expected to be announced by the EMRA soon.
Investments
One of the primary objectives of privatization is to finance required distribution system and network improvements and expansions through private sector investments, thereby removing the burden of such investments away from the state budget. Investments are of great importance in ensuring continuity and quality of service in electricity distribution.
The annual expansion, replacement and improvement investments that are required in each of the 20 distribution regions during the first tariff implementation period (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) have been determined during the preparation of the end-user tariffs. For TEDAS as a whole, the investment requirement for the transition period is a total of YTL 2.8 billion ($2.3 billion), distributed equally to each year of the transition period. These investments have been embedded into the first implementation period tariffs approved by EMRA; hence, they will be recouped by the distribution companies over time.
Investment requirements could be updated by EMRA through the revision mechanisms.
After 2010, distribution companies will prepare annual investment plans each year by making projections on consumption growth, analyzing network expansion requirements and other technical parameters. They will then present these investment plans to EMRA for approval. After receiving EMRA approval, distribution companies are obliged to implement the approved plans. Implementation of these investments (i.e. investment amount and form) will be monitored through investment control and quality measurement mechanisms set up by EMRA in collaboration with the distribution companies.
EMRA approved tariffs do incorporate an allowed level of regulated return on the investments and services to be carried out as part of the electricity sales & distribution activities. In addition to this allowed level of return, the distribution company can create substantial value by beating the preapproved loss/theft and operational efficiency targets.
The progress so far
On January 9, 2007, the Turkish government announced the postponement of the privatization of parts of the country's electricity distribution network amid fears that it would lead to higher prices for consumers in a general election year. During a trip abroad, the prime minister unsettled some of his cabinet colleagues and the financial markets by suggesting that the sell-off might be too politically sensitive as Turkey nears polls, scheduled for Recently, the government also raised the price of electricity for residential use by 22 percent, and the price of electricity for industrial use by 21 recently.
The price hikes, part of an overhaul of Turkey's electricity pricing mechanism, is seen as an important step for the privatizations of electricity distribution and production assets.
Next up for sale are power grids covering the central Anatolian region of Meram, and Aras in the east.
Why should the distribution be privatized?
The growing empirical evidence on the inefficiency of state-owned Electricity is a product that is generally regarded as nonstorable 16 . Also, the demand for electricity fluctuates by time of day and year, as the weather varies, and randomly. Supply is also subject to unpredictable outages.
However, the equilibrium between supply and demand, called "electrical equilibrium", must be maintained continuously and throughout the system, which calls for extremely close minute-by-minute coordination between generation and transmission & distribution.
In view of technical characteristics of the industry, a policy of vertically integrated monopoly has some attractions. The integrated generation/transmission/distribution company can easily run its power stations that meet demand at minimum cost at each point in time. Moreover, in the longer run, investment can be planned to give the optimal mix and capacity to meet prospective demand with reasonable security of supply. This is, actually, the main reason why these activities have historically been vertically integrated. Nevertheless, since they allow no room for competition and its associated incentives, such schemes nowadays have started to be replaced by vertically separated private utilities with the aim of fostering competition.
In economic theory, the reasons for privatization are manifold. The ultimate and most important aim of privatization is ensuring "economic efficiency"; and it can be realized in full sense only by effective competition, which requires reducing the role of government in economic life as a whole. The case for private ownership rests essentially on the importance of incentives to innovate and to reduce costs. The weak incentive of government employees concerning both cost reduction and innovation is the basic reason of superiority of private ownership. In a state-owned company, prices do not reflect costs; and costs themselves are usually inflated through excessive employment and excessively expensive capital; incentives to innovate are reduced to minimum (or in worst cases to zero); quality of service is lower than in a competitive environment; and the number of choices available to consumers is extremely limited (or even reduced to one!). What is more striking and dangerous is that until the point when it is seen to be in crisis from outside, a public enterprise never feels a failure no matter what is the degree of its failure in realizing economic efficiency.
The other reasons for privatization cited in the literature may be summarized as follows. Privatization provides competition with a fertile ground to develop.
Also, it is argued that the valuation of the company by movements in its share price in stock exchanges is potentially an important check on a privatized enterprise's performance. Moreover, the possibility of a hostile takeover in a competitive market imposes a fierce discipline on the management and provides a powerful incentive to good management because a takeover usually leads to many changes near the top.
Furthermore, some scholars claim that the most important effect of privatization is that the changes it brings about become practically irreversible. In the case of reforming public enterprises, the possibility is much greater that a change of government or even just a change in the opinion of the same government will undermine all reforms and may result in a return to the old interventionism and confusion. Privatization, on the other hand is less reversible not only because the legislation needed to reverse it would be more complex, and because in some cases the privatized bodies have disappeared into other firms or acquired overseas ownership, but also because too many interests have been created that are opposed to renationalization (Erdogdu, 2005) .
In Turkish case, the officially declared reasons for the privatization of electricity distribution regions are as follows (OIB, 2008) : 
Guidelines for Policy Makers
Having discussed both the background and current status of developments in Turkish electricity distribution segment let me comment on them. On the positive side and from the investors' point of view, the benefits and opportunities of the envisaged system can been summarized as follows. First of all, the investor is allowed to retain excess value derived from outperforming the predetermined loss/theft targets approved by EMRA.
Accordingly, as a result of this policy, technical and non-technical losses, which have become an excessive financial burden in Turkey over the years, are expected to be reduced to single digit figures. Also, the investor is allowed to retain the savings achieved if energy is sourced at a lower wholesale cost than the regulated reference price. This policy will pave the way for construction of low-cost electricity production facilities going forward.
Furthermore, the investor is allowed to retain excess value derived from outperforming the predetermined operational improvement targets approved by EMRA. This will trigger efficiency improvements in electricity distribution.
At each distribution company, substantial operational efficiency improvements are believed to be achievable through optimizing core business processes such as billing and collections, arranging and redesigning work flows, enabling effective coordination between divisions, improving information systems and infrastructure and optimizing personnel productivity (Lazard, 2007) .
Within this context, the efficiency improvements in distribution segment is especially crucial since distribution cost together with generation cost make up more than 75% of electricity bill of a household in Turkey, which means that any efficiency increase in distribution industry may be redirected to reductions in electricity bills. Table 4 provides the distribution of costs in electricity bill of a household in Turkey.
[ Table 4 goes here ]
On the negative side, there exist some crucial problems that must be addressed to establish a healthy system of electricity distribution. First of all, as indicated, the main components of electricity price can be divided into the wholesale price, the price of network operations (transmission & distribution) and taxes. Since wholesale price, tax related issues and the price of transmission network operations are outside the scope of the present paper, let me concentrate on the price of distribution network operations. We know that even tax level, wholesale price and the price of transmission network operations are determined efficiently, total welfare can be significantly disturbed if distribution network operations are priced inefficiently. In literature, it is argued that if a sector presents natural monopoly characteristics (i.e., real competition is not possible), the only two reasonable ways to determine the price of distribution network operations are benchmarking and frequent tenders. However, in Turkey, the current model seems to be based on a kind of rate of return regulation, in which costs are determined by the regulated firm and the regulator approves them before their reflection into tariffs. Since, the regulator cannot determine the optimal level of costs due to the problem of asymmetric information; such a system is far from ensuring economic efficiency. Therefore, a kind of benchmarking or frequent tenders should be incorporated in tariff determination process in Turkey
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. Second, the current situation of continued state-ownership of the distribution companies limits the supervisory role of EMRA over the market. The lack of necessary incentive mechanisms for managers and bureaucrats in the distribution companies makes regulatory enforcement more difficult and leaves room for political pressure in the industry. Therefore, the privatization of distribution companies must be completed as soon as possible in an appropriate way. The opposition to privatization of some bureaucrats will definitely be formidable. To counter this, a chairman who is more favorable to privatization may be appointed to the enterprises to be privatized 18 .
Third, it seems that current model of privatization (TOR) is preferred in electricity distribution to prevent a situation of double payment by end-users.
Since infrastructure costs have already been recouped by the state-more precisely, by taxpayers-prior to privatization, if the distribution assets are sold, then the purchasing company would reflect such asset costs to the tariffs and customers will be made to pay twice for the same cost. Although it is a reasonable approach, the use of the TOR model as the method of privatization creates its own problems. For instance, it seems that in the tenders for distribution regions the competing firms will bid based on the shares of the distribution company which will be the unique licensee for the distribution of electricity in the designated region. However, such a method is far from realizing irreversibility of the privatization process as it is very easy to return back to previous structure since ownership of the assets are not transferred to private parties. Actually, from an economic point of view, a method based on the transfer of asset ownership to private parties and a tender based on "unit service and depreciation charge" are much more preferable to current practices.
The fourth concern is related with ambiguity of the process following tenders.
That is, how long will a firm be a unique licensee for the distribution of electricity in the designated region? If an incumbent distribution company prefers to put an end to its activities, what will happen? Will there be another tender? If yes, will new firm pay to previous firm for the shares? In the literature, it is stated that repeating tenders on a specific basis is urgent if benchmarking is not employed in the tariff determination process because it remains the only way to reflect the cost reductions to consumers. If both benchmarking and frequent tenders are not employed, then the incumbent firm gets all benefits of cost reduction without reflecting them to tariffs. In Turkey, both of these methods are not planned to be employed so there exists a threat of excessive profits in the sector.
Other three concerns relate to "expertise", "effective regulation" and , or if the firms are effectively in a repeated interaction (or, "game") with one another via frequent contracts. The second reason is that one firm might enjoy such strategic advantages in the competition for the franchise that other firms would be unwilling to compete with it. For instance, suppose that an incumbent firm is the holder of a franchise that is now up for renewal. Since, thanks to its past operation of the franchise, the incumbent has already reduced its costs; other firms will be unwilling to compete with the incumbent as they know that they are unlikely to win the competition. Also, another source of incumbent advantage may originate from asymmetries of information. The incumbent's knowledge of cost and demand conditions is likely superior to that of any other firm, which tends to deter others from competing with it in the future auction.
The merits of auction model are further reduced by the issues related with asset handover. Unless sunk costs are zero (an extremely unlikely event), efficiency requires that the new operator of the franchise takes over the assets from the incumbent
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. Therefore, one needs to decide how the assets to be valued for this purpose. In such a case, there is a problem of bilateral monopoly. If incumbent has no alternative, it has to accept as little as the scrap value of the assets. If the new operator firm has no alternative, it has to pay as much as their replacement value. The gap between replacement value and scrap value is likely to be large if the assets involve sunk costs.
The last difficulty with auction model is the question of specification, administration and monitoring of franchise contract. The duration of franchise contract must also be considered. The difficulties of contract specification and administration perhaps suggest that short-term contracts have advantages, because fewer future unforeseeable events then need to be considered. Nevertheless, the organization of frequent contests for the franchise also involves major costs: all the problems of asset valuation and handover occur more often, and the industry would frequently be in a state of turmoil.
Conclusion
Although Turkish electricity reform is not concluded yet, we can assess its performance to date in achieving its primary goals. The reform is quite complex and addresses different objectives. The main one is to change the government to policy-maker and regulator, transferring the responsibility of operations and investment to the private sector. This change was imposed by its unwillingness and incapacity to finance system expansion and by the urgent necessity of attracting private investment, which is crucial to avoid an electricity supply collapse. That is, the privatization of the Turkish electricity distribution sector is not a social option; it is mandated by economic constraints, since the government does not have the capacity to invest and guarantee electricity supply to support economic growth.
In this paper, we have tried to present current situation of Turkish electricity distribution privatizations and summarize some problems that surround them. In a few words, Turkey is at a crossroads and she needs to answer the question of whether the operation and management of electricity distribution networks in this country will evolve into a market-driven commodity business or remain a genuine public utility task. As only a limited number of actions has been taken in the privatization process so far, a significant amount of work still lies ahead to answer that question. 2 For a more in depth discussion of nuclear energy in Turkey, see Erdogdu (2007c) . 3 The industrials customer group represents approximately 50% of the total demand, while residential customers consume slightly less than a quarter of the total. Commercials customer group, excluding public institutions, is placed third in terms of consumption with a 13% share.
4 Turkey imports 96.9% of her natural gas consumption.
5 The author himself is working for the EMRA.
6 Unless otherwise stated, this part is mainly based on the information included in Erdogdu (2005) . 7 In 1982, however, distribution was also transferred to TEK, thus making TEK a national vertically integrated monopoly fully owned by the state.
8 Under the BOO model, investors retain ownership of the facility at the end of the contract period. That is, it is a kind of licensing system rather than a concession award.
9 A typical BOT, BOO or TOOR generation contract, signed between the private party and TEAS or TEDAS, includes exclusive "take or pay" obligations with fixed quantities (in general, 85% of the plant output) and prices (or price formulas) over 15-30 years. That is, under these models, the government retains most commercial risks while providing the private sector with substantial rewards. Also the situation was worse in Turkey as, in Turkish case; there was no requirement for prequalification or even for a competitive open tender to conclude these contracts (Atiyas and Dutz, 2003) , which resulted in onerous terms and high electricity prices. 
